Read and validate digital certificates
An X.509 certificate is a signed record that binds a public key to an identity or identifier. Its fields include the issuer, subject, serial number, validity dates, public key, and extensions such as Subject Alternative Name (SAN), Key Usage, and Extended Key Usage.
To request a certificate, the requesting system typically generates a key pair. It includes the public key and requested information in a certificate signing request (CSR) and signs the request with the corresponding private key. The private key stays with the requester or its key-management service. A registration authority, when used, verifies the requester or identifiers on behalf of the certificate authority (CA). An issuing CA, often an intermediate, signs the certificate after the required checks.
To validate a certificate, a client builds a path from the end-entity certificate through any intermediate CAs to a configured trust anchor, often represented by a self-signed root certificate. The client trusts the root because it is configured as a trust anchor. Browsers and operating systems maintain trust stores, and organizations may install private roots. Applications can also pin an expected certificate or public key under a managed policy with a plan for rotation.
Clients check signatures, validity periods, constraints, and permitted uses. A TLS client also checks that the certificate matches the requested service identity. Repositories can publish certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs). OCSP lets a client request certificate status from a responder. With OCSP stapling, a server periodically obtains a signed status response and supplies it during the TLS handshake. Status checking depends on client policy and deployment.
- Domain and Extended Validation
- Domain Validation verifies control of a domain. Extended Validation adds checks on the organization’s identity. Either certificate can support an encrypted connection. The checks do not certify that a site or its content is safe.
- SAN and wildcard names
- A SAN extension can list multiple DNS names and IP addresses. A wildcard such as
*.example.commatchesportal.example.com. It does not coverexample.comorfiles.portal.example.comunless a separate matching name is listed. - Device and code signing certificates
- A device certificate supports machine authentication. A code signing certificate identifies the signer and enables a verifier to check whether the signed content changed after signing.
RFC 2986 · Certificate requests · RFC 5280 · X.509 and CRLs · RFC 9525 · TLS service identity · RFC 6960 · OCSP
Manage trust and keys at scale
A public key infrastructure (PKI) combines people, policies, processes, software, and hardware to issue, distribute, use, and revoke certificates. It supports authentication for people, devices, and services. Application policy still determines what an authenticated identity may access.
- Hierarchical trust. A root CA signs intermediate CA certificates, and issuing CAs sign end-entity certificates. Keeping the root key offline can reduce exposure.
- Distributed trust. Multiple CAs operate under their own trust anchors. A relying party can configure multiple anchors, or PKIs can establish trust paths through cross-certification.
- Bridge trust. A bridge CA cross-certifies participating PKIs so paths can be built between them. Participants continue issuing credentials under their own policies.
Inventory certificates and owners, monitor expiration, and automate renewal or replacement where practical. Protect private keys with appropriate access controls and secure storage. Use escrow or recovery for designated encryption keys when policy requires it. Sharing a signing private key can undermine accountability. If a key is compromised, revoke the affected certificate as applicable, stop using the key, and replace it. Define suspension where supported, and set retention and destruction rules for retired key material.
NIST SP 800-57 · Key management · Federal Bridge CA · Cross-certification framework (PDF)
Choose secure communication protocols
- TLS and HTTPS
- TLS succeeded SSL. HTTPS carries HTTP over a TLS-protected connection. The handshake authenticates the server in typical web deployments and establishes keys for protecting traffic.
- IPsec
- Protects traffic at the IP layer. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) can provide encryption, integrity, and authentication. Authentication Header (AH) provides integrity and authentication without encryption. Transport mode protects upper-layer traffic within an IP packet, while tunnel mode encapsulates the original IP packet inside a new one.
- SSH
- Protects remote administration, file transfer, and forwarding. It can authenticate the server using a host key and authenticate users separately.
- S/MIME
- Uses certificates and cryptography to sign or encrypt email message content across mail systems.
- SRTP
- Protects real-time media, such as VoIP audio, against disclosure, tampering, and replay when configured for those protections.
Choose based on where protection needs to begin and end. TLS can secure a specific application connection. An IPsec tunnel between gateways can carry traffic for several applications. Message or media protection addresses different parts of the communication path.
TLS 1.3 · IPsec architecture · SSH architecture · S/MIME 4.0 · SRTP
Implement cryptography with sound parameters
Generate keys using a cryptographically secure random generator. Select key sizes for the algorithm and required security strength. Set a cryptoperiod based on key purpose, exposure, and how long the data needs protection. Use publicly reviewed algorithms and maintained libraries. Protect secret keys and follow the protocol’s configuration requirements.
A block cipher mode defines how an algorithm such as AES handles a message spanning multiple blocks and what protections it provides. ECB can expose repeated patterns. CBC and CTR are confidentiality modes that need separate integrity protection when the protocol uses them. GCM provides authenticated encryption and requires a unique nonce for each encryption under a given key. Verify authentication tags before acting on decrypted data.
NIST · Block Cipher Modes · NIST · Key management and cryptoperiods
Practice case
A certificate warning after a service move. An internal payroll portal moves to payroll.hr.example.com. Its unexpired certificate lists only *.example.com in the SAN. The replacement server presents the leaf certificate by itself. A clean test client already trusts the organization’s root CA and has no copy of the issuing intermediate. It cannot fetch the intermediate.
Can that client build a complete trust path? Does the SAN match the new hostname? How would you correct both problems and verify the deployment?
Review a possible answer
Configure the server to send the issuing intermediate with its leaf certificate. The client already has the trusted root. Request and deploy a certificate with payroll.hr.example.com in its SAN. The original wildcard covers only one label before example.com. Retest with a clean client by checking the presented chain, SAN match, validity period, and any revocation checks required by policy.
Read and watch
- Review the rules for matching DNS names, IP addresses, and wildcards. RFC 9525 · Service Identity in TLS
- Review key lifecycles, protection, and recovery. NIST · Recommendation for Key Management
- Watch how a TLS connection uses certificates and establishes keys. Computerphile video · Transport Layer Security