Identify the wireless technology and its risks
- Cellular
- Service providers operate radio networks divided into coverage cells. Organizations still manage risks on their own devices, applications, and accounts that use those networks.
- Bluetooth
- Uses short-range radio for devices such as headsets and sensors. A piconet is a small network of Bluetooth devices. Bluejacking sends unsolicited messages. Bluesnarfing refers to unauthorized data access. Keep devices updated, verify pairing prompts, and limit discoverability.
- Near field communication (NFC)
- Supports close-range interactions such as reading a tag or making a contactless payment. Short range reduces exposure. Relay attacks can extend an exchange beyond the intended distance, and untrusted tags can direct users to malicious links.
- Radio frequency identification (RFID)
- Uses readers and tags to identify or track items. Passive tags draw power from the reader’s field and can be built into thin labels. Active tags have their own power source. Risks vary by design and include unauthorized reading, tracking, or cloning.
Understand WLAN design and attacks
Wi-Fi uses the IEEE 802.11 family of standards. A client’s wireless adapter connects to an access point (AP). Home wireless routers typically combine the AP, router, and switch in one device. An autonomous or fat AP is configured locally. A lightweight or thin AP relies on centralized management. A wireless LAN controller (WLC) or cloud management platform can distribute configuration and coordinate monitoring. A captive portal can show terms or require a sign-in before granting access. Configure link protection separately.
- Rogue AP and evil twin
- A rogue AP is unauthorized and can create an unmanaged path if it connects to the wired network. An evil twin mimics a legitimate network, commonly by copying its SSID, to lure clients. The same AP can satisfy both descriptions.
- Interception
- Radio traffic can be received beyond the building perimeter. An attacker can read unprotected traffic or abuse access gained through a rogue AP to observe traffic visible on its wired segment. Link encryption, application TLS, and network segmentation protect different parts of the path.
- Wireless denial of service
- Jamming interferes with radio reception. Forged deauthentication or disassociation frames can disconnect clients when those frames are unprotected. Abusing the duration field can make nearby devices defer transmissions. Protected Management Frames help protect certain management frames from forgery. RF jamming still requires separate investigation.
Choose Wi-Fi authentication and encryption
WEP combined a shared key with an initialization vector but suffered from structural weaknesses. Original WPA used TKIP as a transitional protection for older equipment. Retire both. Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) simplifies enrollment, but its PIN method has known weaknesses. Disable WPS when it is unnecessary. MAC filtering can help with device inventory or basic policy, but addresses can be observed and spoofed.
- WPA2
- Use AES-CCMP, which uses AES counter mode for confidentiality and CBC-MAC for integrity and data origin authentication. WPA2-Personal uses a pre-shared key. WPA2-Enterprise uses 802.1X for network access control.
- 802.1X and EAP
- The client is the supplicant. The AP is typically the authenticator, and a backend server such as RADIUS handles authentication. EAP carries the authentication exchange and supports methods such as EAP-TLS, which uses certificates. Managed clients should validate the expected server certificate and identity.
- WPA3
- WPA3-Personal uses Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) to resist passive offline password guessing. WPA3 requires Protected Management Frames for WPA3 connections. WPA3-Enterprise uses enterprise authentication and offers an optional 192-bit security mode for compatible deployments.
Separate guest and enterprise access. Restrict guest traffic from internal resources, and verify the security mode clients actually negotiate. Test older devices before changing compatibility settings.
Survey the site and monitor the airspace
Start a site survey with coverage and capacity requirements. Measure signal strength, signal-to-noise ratio, interference, and channel use where clients will operate. Check throughput and roaming with representative devices, including in areas with many simultaneous users. Select AP locations, bands, channels, transmit power, and antenna type and orientation. Measure near building boundaries to understand signal spillover. RF tuning supports the design, while authentication and encryption protect access and traffic wherever the signal can be received.
Maintain an inventory of approved APs, including their BSSIDs and locations. Compare it with observations from dedicated wireless probes or APs that support sensor mode. Coverage depends on sensor placement and scanning settings. Investigate unexpected APs by checking their location, security settings, and any connection to the wired network. An unfamiliar AP can also belong to a neighbor.
Cisco · WLAN Site Survey Guidelines · NIST · WLAN security monitoring
Practice case
Two APs advertise the campus staff network. A wireless sensor reports a new BSSID near the parking lot advertising the staff SSID. Several users report unexpected certificate prompts. The controller lists only the approved APs. The campus staff network normally uses enterprise authentication.
How would you determine whether the AP is an evil twin, an unauthorized AP connected to the campus LAN, or a benign device using the same name? What changes would reduce the risk to managed clients?
Review a possible answer
Compare the observed BSSID and advertised security settings with the inventory. Review controller, authentication, and client logs. Use authorized RF observations and corroborate them with switch, port, or NAC records to determine whether the AP has a campus LAN connection. The copied SSID and unexpected prompts warrant investigation. Confirm the cause before attributing intent.
Configure managed clients to use the approved enterprise profile, validate the expected authentication server certificate and name, and reject unexpected certificates. Use EAP-TLS and Protected Management Frames where supported by the deployment. Keep guest traffic separate and use the incident process to determine whether anyone submitted credentials to an unauthorized service.
Read and watch
- Review WLAN configuration, monitoring, and common threats. NIST · Guidelines for Securing Wireless Local Area Networks
- Compare passive, active, and predictive surveys. Cisco · WLAN Site Survey Guidelines
- Watch a discussion of how to collect accurate field measurements. Video · Wi-Fi Decoded: Performing Accurate Site Surveys